CAPTCHA systems have been widely deployed to identify and block fraudulent bot traffic. However, current solutions, such as Google's reCAPTCHA, often either (i) require additional user actions (e.g., users solving mathematical or imagebased puzzles), or (ii) need to send the attestation data back to the server (e.g., user behavioral data, device fingerprints, etc.), thus raising significant privacy concerns.
Introduction
Bot fraud, perpetrated by automated software agents that interact with content in a human-like way, is becoming more prevalent and pernicious the recent years. A recent study [89] reveals that companies were hit by 3 billion automated bot attacks in the last six months of 2018. In the ad market specifically, the ever-evolving bot-related fraud currently costs companies between $6.5 billion and $19 billion in the U.S. alone and it is estimated that this will grow to $50 billion by 2025 [64] . In 2013, the Chameleon botnet alone was harvesting around 6 million dollars/month from advertisers [76] .
The wide deployment of ad blockers on desktop browsers and the continuous shift to mobile devices and apps [30] , created opportunities for fraudsters to earn high profits by abusing the in-app ad ecosystem and exploiting low-cost mobile devices. Numerous click farms with rows upon rows of zombie phone armies make money by simulating clicks, touch events, and views on ads [61] that nobody actually watches. A recent study [88] using data spanning 17 billion transactions (2018), observes 189 million bot attacks originated from mobile devices; this is an increase of 12% compared to the previous six months.
The current state-of-the-art mechanism to mitigate such attacks is the Completely Automated Public Turing tests to tell Computers and Humans Apart (or just CAPTCHA). CAPTCHA systems have been widely deployed across the web to identify and block fraudulent bot traffic. However, aside from the questionable accuracy of such systems [11, 70, 83, 97] , current implementations (e.g., Securimage [74] , hCaptcha [56] ) either require additional user actions (e.g., image, audio, math, or textual challenges), which significantly impoverish the users' experience [32] especially on mobile devices. Another way to assess the humanness of the user is to track their behavior and centralize the collected information to infer its nature (i.e., human or bot related). To this extent, systems such as invisible reCAPTCHA [60] , have raised significant privacy concerns [2, 22, 81] . Our approach: To address both of the challenges above, in this paper, we present ZKSENSE: a novel privacy-preserving mechanism for bot detection in mobile devices. ZKSENSE leverages motion sensors, such as the gyroscope and accelerometer, to sense device's motion triggered by user's interactions with an app. Contrary to similar approaches [46, 53] , that require user to perform specific actions (i.e., tilt the device), ZKSENSE is completely friction-less, thus requiring zero additional involvement from the user. The goal of ZKSENSE is to infer whether a specific performed action (e.g., click/type/touch event) was carried out by a human or a bot, even when there are artificial device movements (i.e., mobile device is placed on a swinging cradle [98] Contrary to the state-of-the-art, (i.e., invisible re-CAPTCHA) where raw data is transferred to a remote server that performs the classification, in ZKSENSE we perform the classification locally, on the user's device, and transmit only the final result (i.e., bot or human) to the server. This way, not a single bit of potentially sensitive data leaves the user device, thus preserving the user privacy. To verify the validity of the result ZKSENSE uses zero knowledge (ZK) proofs [36] . Contributions: In this paper, we make the following main contributions:
1. We design ZKSENSE: a sensor-based and contextaware bot detection system that attests the humanness of the performed actions on a mobile device without adding any friction to the user experience. ZKSENSE uses a ML-model to detect if an action was triggered by a bot or a human by studying the output of the mobile device's motion sensors during the particular action (e.g., click). To train our model we use publicly available sensor traces for setting the ground truth. In addition, we instrument Brave browser for Android and capture both user clicks and sensor traces from a small set real users.
Our approach is tested under various bot scenarios: (i) when device is resting (on a table), (ii) when there is artificial movement from device's vibration, (iii) when the device is docked on a artificial movement generating swinging cradle. 2. To protect the users privacy, in ZKSENSE we perform the detection on the user side and we leverage non-interactive zero knowledge proofs to ensure the integrity of the detection result, while reporting back to a remote auditor. We implement a library for enclosing results of SVM (Support-Vector Machine) classifiers in zero-knowledge proofs. Our library is based on ZoKrates [102] , which leverages ZK-SNARKs [44] . 3. By leveraging the above library, we implement an Android app to showcase the detection accuracy of ZKSENSE (see demo video in [99] ). Our prototype is using the accelerometer and gyroscope to attest the humanness of a touch-screen event on the mobile device. The attestation takes place in the background, asynchronously, so it does not affect the user experience and the result of the classification is transmitted to a remote server along with ZK proofs. Our system is able to detect if an action was triggered by a bot or a human with 91% accuracy.
Background on Zero-Knowledge Proofs
Data integrity and privacy, as well as trusted computation, are some of the key challenges in data-driven environments. Whenever parties exchange data, they are exposed to a potential data breach. In addition, the data receiver must verify the integrity of the transmitted data. These challenges are the main motivation behind the design of zero-knowledge proofs (ZKPs) and verifiable privacy-enhancing technology.
Interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs
Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKPs) were introduced in the 1980s by Goldwasser et al. [35] . Authors presented an interactive cryptographic algorithm to enable one party (a prover) to convince an other party (a verifier) about the validity of a certain statement. The statement being proved must include the assertion that the prover has such knowledge, without revealing any other information about the knowledge itself. During this interaction the verifier learns nothing but whether the statement is true or not.
Interactive zero-knowledge proofs require interaction between (a) the party proving their knowledge and (b) the party validating the proof. Interactive ZKPs must satisfy the properties of (i) completeness: if the statement is true, the honest verifier will be convinced of this fact by an honest prover (ii) soundness: if the statement is false, the probability for a cheating prover to convince an honest verifier that it is true is practically negligible. (iii) zero-knowledge: if the statement is true, verifier learns nothing more than the fact that the statement is true.
Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs
Blum et al. [10] introduced the non-interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs (NIZKPs), which enables the prover to prove the validity of a statement without interacting with the verifier. The prover simply sends one message to the verifier, and the verifier either accepts or rejects. Both the prover and verifier have access to a random public string trusted to be random by both. NIZKPs enjoy a growing popularity and adoption in the blockchain era, used mostly for decentralization, verifiability and accountability on anonymous blockchain technologies [8, 15, 91] .
The need for a reduced size and lightweight verification procedure (ideal for blockchain based applications) pushed for numerous improvements in the past years [12, 33, 43, 73] . This progress resulted in several proposed schemes such as ZK-SNARKs [44] , ZK-STARKs [7] or Bulletproofs [17] (see Figure 1 ) that became the backbone of various real-world applications: e.g., privacy-protecting digital currencies [50] , anonymous verifiable voting [42] , distributed ledgers that provide private transactions and contracts [23] , accountabilityproviding distributed VPN systems [92] .
ZK-SNARKs: Specifically, a Zero Knowledge Succinct
Non-interactive ARguments of Knowledge (ZK-SNARKs) enables the prover to generate a NIZKP of constant size of any NP-statement. This makes it a useful tool not only for blockchain-based applications, but for any scenario that a Scheme Proving Verification Proof Size Time Time ZK-SNARKs [44] n log(n) l 1 ZK-STARKs [7] n polylog(n) polylog(n) polylog(n) Bulletproofs [17] n log(n) n log(n) log(n) Figure 1 : Comparison of proposed proof schema, where l is the number of inputs and n the length of the circuit representing the computation to be proven.
party wants to prove the knowledge of a solution to an NPproblem, while maintaining small size proofs and low verification computation time. However succinctness in ZK-SNARKs comes at the cost of high proving computational effort and the need of a pre-existing trusted setup. The trusted setup generates a set of public parameters used to construct and verify proofs 1 . Note, however, that trust is only required by verifiers and in our case, there is only one verifying entity, the service provider. Thus, the latter can be the entity which generates the public parameters without neither harming the integrity of the scheme nor requiring complex multi-party protocols such as the ones used by Zerocash [8] and in AZTEC Ignition ceremony [75] .
ZK-STARKs:
A relatively new alternative of ZK-SNARKs are the zero knowledge Scalable Transparent ARguments of Knowledge (ZK-STARKs) [7] . ZK-STARKs are relatively more proving-time efficient NIZKPs and are constructed under post-quantum cryptographic assumptions, as opposed to ZK-SNARKs which are prone to attack by quantum computers. Moreover, ZK-STARKs remove the need of a trusted setup in exchange of a poly-logarithmic growth (with respect to the size of the circuit representing the computation to be proven) in the size and verification time of the proof. Contrarily, ZK-SNARKs have a constant size in the proof size, as shown in Figure 1 . Other proposals that do not require trusted setups include Bulletproofs [17] or Supersonic [18] .
ZKSENSE on top of ZK-SNARKs
In ZKSENSE, the bot detection component, running on the user device, provides verifiable results to a remote auditor by reporting NIZKPs together with the result. This way, the auditor can be certain of the integrity and privacy of the computation. To generate such zero-knowledge proofs we leverage the ZoKrates toolbox. ZoKrates uses the Rust implementation of the Bellman library [84] of ZK-SNARKs 2 .
While ZK-SNARKs have made significant headway to being a well-established and adopted protocol, ZK-STARKs are recently being touted as their improved version when it comes to computation time on the prover side as seen in Figure 1 . Utilizing ZK-STARKs in ZKSENSE would reduce the prover computational overhead (as measured in Section 6). However, the large size of the generated proofs (see Figure 1 ) and the lack of mature and well-maintained ZK-STARKs libraries 3 made us choose to build our prototype on top of ZK-SNARKs and ZoKrates.
Motivation
In this section, we present the threat model of our work as well as some of the basic design principles that a humanness verification mechanism must have in order to constitute a successful solution for the bot detection problem.
Key Design Principles
In this paper, we believe that a successful contribution to the problem of distinguishing bot activity in mobile devices should have the following basic characteristics, around which we build our approach:
1. Be friction-less: Many existing commercial mechanisms require from the user to solve mathematical quizzes or image and audio challenges [56, 74] , thus severely hampering the user experience. Indeed, according to studies [3] : (i) humans will only agree on what the CAPTCHA says 71% of the time, (ii) visual CAPTCHAs take 9.8 seconds to complete, while Audio CAPTCHAs take 28.4 seconds (and 50% of the Audio CAPTCHA users will quit). Other related research works [46] reduce the user friction by requiring from user to tilt phone during the humanness verification procedure in order to retrieve proper input from motion sensors. Similar to their follow up paper [45] , in ZKSENSE, we detect bot behavior based on the device movements that happen during user actions (e.g., typing, clicking). 2. Be privacy-preserving: To avoid harming the user experience, mechanisms like Google's Invisible re-CAPTCHA [60] track the user while they browse the web. Specifically, website administrators have to embed the Invisible reCAPTCHA code on all of the pages of their website so: (i) the visitor's behavior is tracked, (ii) the produced data are sent to Google servers, (iii) the risk scores are computed and finally, (iv) they are shared with the website's administrator. Of course, this pervasive behavioral tracking raises significant concerns regarding its implications on the user privacy [22, 81] . In ZKSENSE, and unlike similar sensor-based approaches [45, 46, 53] , we decouple the bot detection process from the remote auditor. Instead, the anomaly detection is happening on the user side and the remote auditor learns only the result of this process via ZK proofs that guarantee the integrity of the detection process. 3. Assume that detection code can be tampered: One way to implement user-side bot detection, and ensure the integrity of the result, is to run the corresponding code from within a secure enclave of a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Indeed, there are several proposals [58] relying on such hardware support like ARM's TrustZone [5] , Apple's Secure Enclave [4] , Samsung's KNOX [79] or Intel's SGX [55] . By design such architectures allow arbitrary code to run within the trusted hardware, however, these TEEs are not widely available on mobile devices, especially low-end ones at the moment. It is apparent thus, that such an approach would have limited applicability nowadays. Hence, in ZKSENSE, we assume that attacker can tamper with the user-side running classifier and therefore the integrity of the classifier's model needs to be verified on every humanness verification procedure.
Threat Model
In this paper, we assume an attacker who controls an arbitrary number of mobile devices, which are part of a wellinstrumented botnet. Through this botnet, the attacker performs automated actions to imitate a legitimate user (i.e., view ads, perform ad clicks) for monetary gain. This monetary gain can be achieved either (i) indirectly: website owners pay the attacker to get a number of ad clicks and thus increase the revenues they get from a pay-per-click (PPC) ad model, or (ii) directly: attacker registers for reward schemes (e.g., Brave's Ad Rewards [14] ) via multiple accounts, which imitate user activity to claim the rewards. Such an attacker can: User is a Bot
User is a Human
Trusted Sensor Outputs Figure 4 : High-level overview of the ZKSENSE architecture. An integrated ML-based classifier studies the patterns of sensor outputs right before, during, and shortly after a click event. To avoid leaking sensitive sensor output outside the device, the classification appears on the user side and the client has to prove the integrity of the reported result to the external auditor.
3. Run the applications in an emulator. 4. Provide fake sensor outputs.
Reverse-engineer code of deployed countermeasures.
Assumptions: Throughout the rest of this paper, by user activity, we assume clicking via screen touching. Of course, such activity can also include key typing, mouse hovering, or scrolling. In addition, we assume an untrusted mobile device equipped with trusted hardware capable of hashing and signing motion sensor output similar to what is already used in this research area [34, 45, 59 ].
Our Approach: ZKSENSE
In this section, we present the design of our approach. We begin with a straw-man approach and step-by-step, we describe how we are able to detect fraudulent bot activity without harming the privacy of the user.
System Overview
By monitoring the output of device's sensors during human and bot activity it is easy to anticipate that whenever a human user performs a click on the mobile's display, the force applied during the touch event generates motion. This motion is be captured by the embedded IMU (Inertial Measurement Unit) sensors (e.g., accelerometer and gyroscope). By contrast, fraudulent bots use software simulated touches to fulfil their task. Since there is no external force exerted by fingers, there is no noticeable change in the sensor outputs.
In Figure 2 , we present a snapshot of how the output of the sensors look like during a click event when this is performed (i) by a bot and (ii) by a human. As one can observe, the maximum linear acceleration movement is up to 8.5× greater in case of human click (i.e., accelerometer senses a max rate of change of 0.6 in case of human and 0.07 in case of bot). Similarly, the maximum angular rotational velocity is up to 4.9× greater in case of a human click (i.e., gyroscope in absolute numbers senses a max rate of change of 0.024 in case of human click and 0.0049 in case of bot).
In Figure 3 , we present a snapshot of the same sensors' output in the case of a bot click during artificial device movement. We see that the motion generated is comparable with the case of the human click depicted in Figure 2 . Specifically, (i) on the left, we present the sensors' output in case of a bot click during vibration. We see that the accelerometer senses the same force with the case of the human click 4 but for a longer period. The gyroscope though senses greater angular rotational velocity and for longer period than in the case of a human's click. On the right, (ii) we present the sensors' output when there is a bot triggered click and the device is docked on a swing. As one can observe, when the gyroscope senses similar angular rotational velocity with the case of the human click, the accelerometer senses for a long period (up to 3.8×) greater linear acceleration movement in the case of a bot triggered click.
Building upon these observations, ZKSENSE uses an MLbased classifier to study the pattern of sensor outputs before, during, and shortly after a click event. Based on this information, the model decides about whether the action was triggered by a human or not. In Figure 4 , we present a basic overview of our system.
Preserving the user privacy
In existing approaches like Google's ReCAPTCHA classifiers like above are deployed in a centralized way, on the server, while the app is responsible for collecting IMU sensor data and sending them back to the server as input for the classifier. However, studies [25, 62, 72, 77, 80, 100] have shown that IMU sensor data is sensitive: it may reveal keystrokes, gender, age, and can be used to fingerprint users. Privacy-preserving evaluation of machine learning models has become increasingly important especially in the post GDPR era. One approach to mitigate this would be to encrypt the data on the client and send them to the server for classification. This can be achieved using Homomorphic Encryption [13, 29, 41] . However, the scalability of such approach for services with many clients is fairly limited. Indeed, each client would need to encrypt their data with their own key and send the ciphertext to the server who evaluates the model over the encrypted data. Then the server would need to send the outcome of the homomorphic computation back to the user who would provably decrypt it and send it back to the server. It is easy to anticipate that the overhead to perform such multi-step operation for each client is unbearable for services with millions of clients.
In ZKSENSE, we move the classifier to the edge by running it on the user side and report only the result to the remote server (auditor). As a result, ZKSENSE ensures that no sensor data that could harm the user privacy can leave the device. In Figure 4 , we present the high level overview of our approach. As we can see, each click event triggers a humanness attestation procedure where the motion sensor outputs are feeding the Humanness Prover module, which runs a trained model to classify if the action was conducted by a human or a bot based on the sensor input. The result of this classification is transmitted to a remote auditor, which acts accordingly based on that e.g., if the click was performed by a bot the requested web transaction will get declined.
Bot Classification

Data Collection
To collect the necessary ground truth to train the various tested models, we instrumented the open source browser Brave 5 for Android to capture click events (and their corresponding motion sensor traces) performed during browsing. Then, we recruited a small number of 6 volunteering students (6 devices) that used our instrumented browser for 22 consecutive days for their daily browsing. The device models used include: 5 https://github.com/brave/brave-browser Bot Detection 6 We divide each click event into two segments:
Pressing Down
Releasing Up Figure 6 : The period of a click event starts 50ms before the beginning of the action and ends 250ms after the end of it.
Google Pixel 3, Samsung Galaxy S9, S8 and S6, OnePlus 6, and Huawei Mate 20 Lite. Volunteers were well-informed about the purpose of this study and gave us consent to collect and analyse the motion sensor traces generated during their click events. We asked volunteers to use their phone as normal when using the browser to reflect reality.
To generate bot traffic, we used adb to automate software clicks on 4 of the volunteering devices. To test different attack scenarios, during the automation, we generate software clicks with the device being in 4 different states:
1. while resting on a platform (desk/stand) 2. while being carried around in pocket 3. while being placed on a swing motion device 4. while device is vibrating (triggered by adb) 6 As summarized in Figure 5 , by the end of the data collection, we had 7,736 human generated clicks and 25,921 bot generated clicks.
Feature Selection
During our data collection, accelerometer and gyroscope sensors were sampled at 250Hz. For each click event, we not only consider the device motion during the touch, but also the device motion right before and shortly after the touch. In particular, we consider the period starting at 50ms before the click event and ends at 250ms after the click event. Then, we split each period into two segments: (i) before releasing finger and (ii) after releasing finger as depicted in Figure 6 . For each axis (x/y/z) in accelerometer and gyroscope, we calculate the average and standard deviation of its outputs in each segment. In addition, we calculate the consecutive difference of sensor outputs in each segment and use the average and standard deviation of these differences as features. As a result, we compose a feature vector of size 48 to characterise each click event. 
Data Integrity
Classification Accuracy
Using the above features, we test several ML classifiers and we perform 10-fold cross validation. Figure 8 presents the weighted F 1 score and recall of the different classifiers we tested. We choose weighted F 1 score as an evaluation index because our dataset is unbalanced. Here, the recall means the proportion of correctly identified bot clicks over all bot clicks. In other words, the recall indicates the ability to capture bot clicks. In most use cases of ZKSENSE, the recall is more important than the precision because the latter can be compensated using a fallback CAPTCHA system. As shown in Figure 8 , the four tested classifiers (i.e., SVM, decision tree, random forest, and neural network with ReLU kernel) have similar performance in terms of recall (i.e., 0.95 recall). Although, Decision Tree and Random Forest perform slighlty better in terms of accuracy, in ZKSENSE, we utilize SVM for compatibility purposes as stated in more detail in Section 4.3. Hence, our system's overall accuracy in detecting bots is 91%.
Provable and Privacy-Preserving ML Evaluation
In Section 3.2, we assume powerful attackers that are capable of tampering with the source code of our approach. This means that an attacker could cheat the system by replaying sensor outputs captured during legit human click events or tamper with the shipped model and report invalid results to the auditor. To address that, ZKSENSE leverages ZK proofs to perform privacy-preserving provable ML evaluation, and ensure the integrity of the detection result reported to the auditor. The limited number of existing approaches [24, 27] use ZKP constructions with linear (with respect to the statement to be proven) verification time. This makes such approaches not scalable for online services with multi-million users and complex statements to be proven like ZKSENSE. Contrary to that, ZKSENSE uses ZK-SNARKs (see Section 2 for details), Figure 8 : Accuracy of the various tested classifiers. and this way achieves a scalable verification time, suitable for services many clients. In Figure 7 , we present an overview of the two ML evaluation proving components of ZKSENSE: (i) Humanness Prover and (ii) Humanness Verifier. In ZKSENSE, the Humanness Prover deployed on the client, checks whether a user is a human based on a the pre-trained model and generates a proof to ensure its proper execution. As shown in Figure 7 , the Humanness Prover consists of two more sub-modules: the Feature Integrity Prover and the ML Model Prover:
1. Feature Integrity Prover: This prover aims to ensure that the data originate from the embedded IMU sensors and the features are correctly calculated. 2. ML Model Prover: This prover checks if the ML-based humanness detection model identifies the user as a human or a bot. The result and its proof will be stored locally and also transmitted to the auditor's server.
Respectively, the Humanness Verifier on the auditor's side contains two modules: (i) Feature Integrity Verifier and (ii) ML Model Verifier. If the verification is successful, the auditor will know that (a) the ML-based humanness detection model identifies the user as a human or a bot based on the trusted sensor outputs and that (b) the used model is the genuine one, without though learning the value of sensor outputs.
Provable ML Model
In Section 4.2, we presented the accuracy of the different classifiers tested and we show that they provide similar accuracy. In ZKSENSE, we choose SVM as the underlying model due to its simplicity at evaluation time and its suitability with zero knowledge proofs. While decision trees, random forests, or neural networks provide slightly higher F1 accuracy as shown in Table 8 , we consider that the trade-off is worth the loss in precision. These models need to perform non-linear operations (NNs) or several range proofs, which are expensive operations in ZK-SNARKs. SVMs, on the other hand, need to perform some preprocessing on the data, such as calculating the average, standard deviation or normalising the input points. In this section, we present how to deal with the preprocessing of the data in a provable way.
Feature preprocessing proofs. As mentioned in Section 4.2, ZKSENSE uses the average, µ, and standard deviation, σ, of sensor outputs as features. Therefore, we need to construct proofs to prove that these features are correctly calculated. These operations usually result in non-integer values. Given that ZK-SNARKs are general purpose languages, one could implement floating point arithmetic. However, these would result in an increase in the proving computation time. For this purpose, we limit the number of digits of precision. Nonetheless, when computing the average and standard deviation, we could still fall in non-integer values. To solve this issue we simply use the floor of the average,μ, and standard deviation,μ, and prove that it indeed corresponds to that value.
In particular, suppose we have a vector of integer values v = [v 1 , v 2 , · · · , v n ] and we want to proveμ = µ is the floor of the average of v, then the computation we want to prove is the following:
Similarly, we can prove correct calculation of the floor of the standard deviation (σ):
Furthermore, in order to evaluate the SVM model, we need to calculate the consecutive difference of sensor outputs and their respective average and standard deviation. For the latter, we use the above introduced operations. For the former, we prove the simple arithmetic relation, which in this case is a difference of two integer values.
Finally, before applying the SVM model, the extracted features need first to be normalised. The goal of normalisation is to change data values to a common scale, without distorting differences in the ranges of values. Then, trained SVM weights will be assigned to each normalised feature to calculate the SVM score.
In particular, suppose for each feature f i the normalisation mean, normalisation scale, and SVM weight and intercept are M i , S i , w i and c respectively. Then, the SVM score s can be calculated using the following equation:
Since only the value of f i is secret, we only need to prove the value of ∑ N i=1 f i w i S i . To mitigate the drawback that ZoKrates can only process integer values, we instead prove ∑ N i=1 f i w i S i 10 d and effectively use the parameter d to preserve d-digits after the decimal points of w i S i . Since w i S i is public knowledge, the normalizing proof only requires doing integer multiplication and addition and thus is relatively trivial in ZoKrates.
Implementation
To assess the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach we built and open sourced (i) a prototype of ZKSENSE for Android and (ii) a library for enclosing classification results in ZK proofs. In the remainder of this section, we describe both implementation in detail.
Library for Enclosing SVM Results in a Zero Knowledge Proof
In order to prove the integrity of the classification results we build a library on top of ZoKrates generic-purpose ZK-SNARKs toolbox 7 . ZoKrates works as a high level abstraction for the trusted setup. It enables developers to write the code of the proof, and it takes care of defining the corresponding circuit that will be used to generate the proof. ZoKrates constructs the ZKP by using the generated circuit with the Rust implementation of Bellman [84] , the (commonly called) Groth16 ZK-SNARK [44] . The trusted setup of the Groth16 construction needs to be generated for every different circuit that one wants to make a proof of. It is then of our interest to generate a circuit general enough to accept all touch events. This would be as simple as defining a function that receives as input the array of sensor outputs generated during the touch event. However, ZoKrates supports static arrays, i.e., their size needs to be known at compile time. Because of that, we defined the maximum array size to be 70 which was an upper bound for the size of most of the touch events as defined in Section 4.2. We padded with zeros the events shorter than 70 sensor values. In order for these zeros not to modify the average and standard deviation, we include as input the number of sensor values initially generated by the touch event. Then the proof only uses the values which are in the slice of 'valid' entries.
To prove that a set of values is the pre-image of a hashed sensor value, we test the performance both with the SHA and the Pedersen hash ZoKrates standard library implementations 8 and conclude that the former was more efficient in the proving time. The Pedersen standard library implementation offers a 6-bit input and a 512-bit input version of the hash function. In our library, we choose the former, which allows us to batch more sensor output values. To be exact, given that we use a precision of 6 decimal digits (and hence, can represent each integer with 25 bits) we batch 18 sensor outputs per hash. Given that the gyroscope and accelerometer work in a three dimensional space, and the static size of the array is 70, we need to use signatures over 11 different hashes, and hence prove knowledge of pre-image of 11 Pedersen hashes.
The generated proof is independent of the trained model, as the weights of the SVM model are included as input. This means that if the given model is improved or changed, one does not need to reset the trusted setup phase, but simply change the input values related to the SVM weights. Our library is written in ZoKrates and it is provided open sourced. To integrate our detection engine with ZoKrates we use Android NDK: a development kit to leverage native code.
Prototype of our Approach
Next, we implement a prototype of ZKSENSE for Android, which consists of around a thousand lines of code and it works as a background service for different apps. Our prototype collects the output of the Android's accelerometer and gyroscope during a touch event and, by applying a pre-trained model, it determines if the touch event was performed by a human finger or by a bot.
As previously discussed, we assume that the output of the Android motion sensors is hashed and signed before being used for evaluating the pre-trained model. The integrity of the model and its result is guaranteed by the use of ZKPs and the signatures over the hashed values. For the generation of the ZKPs, we leverage the library we implemented and described previously. The pre-trained model is generated on a server in python. Apart from generating and distributing the trained model, the server also acts as the external auditor that verifies the validity of the transmitted attestation results.
For demonstration purposes we create a toy app with a user interface that shows the output of the detection model and in [99] we provide publicly a video that demonstrates its functionality. In this demo, we test multiple scenarios to showcase the accuracy of our system: 
Real World Use Case of ZKSENSE
In a real-world scenario, an online service would rely on ZKSENSE to ensure that its clients are humans and detect potential frauds. To achieve this, ZKSENSE runs on the user side in conjunction with the service's mobile app (e.g., web browser, banking app, etc.) by importing an SDK in the app's code, and it periodically verifies the humanness of the user. More specifically, each user click will have a specific probability set by the app depending on its needs: the more the frequent tests the higher the overhead on the user's device (CPU utilization, power consumption) as measured in the rest of this section.
Similar to how Cloudflare is using Privacy Pass [26] , cryptographically blind tokens will be issued for the verified user after each successful attestation. These tokens can be used each and every time the user accesses an online service or a website. Contrary to the Cloudflare case [85] , where 30 tokens are issued for each successful solved CAPTCHA, in our case the user does not face any degradation of their user experience, since the entire attestation process is completely transparent.
Performance Evaluation
As a next step we set out to explore the performance of each humanness attestation in ZKSENSE. More specifically, we benchmark our prototype on Android with respect to the duration of its main operations: (i) i.e., bot detection, (ii) Pedersen hash computation, and (iii) zero knowledge proof (ZKP) construction (see Section 4.1). Next, we evaluate general resource utilization metrics: (a) CPU and (b) memory utilization, and (c) battery consumption. Our tests cover the four different key operations of a complete humanness attestation in ZKSENSE:
1. The baseline, where we run our toy application which uses ZKSENSE service (see Section 5) and several bot clicks are emulated. 2. The detection operation, where input from sensors is retrieved and the bot detection is happening on ZKSENSE. 3. The hashing operation where the Pedersen hash computation is taking place. 4. The ZKP operation where the ZK-SNARK is constructed.
We run each stage for an hour during while we ensure the same number of bot clicks by using as an interval the duration of the longest operation (ZKP) as empirically measured.
For our experiments, we leverage a testbed composed of two Android devices representative of a high end (Samsung Galaxy S9, 2018) and a low end (Samsung Galaxy J3, 2018) device. The S9 mounts an octa-core processor (a Quad-Core Mongoose M3 at 2.7GHz and a Quad-Core ARM Cortex-A55 at 1.8Ghz), when the J3 is equipped with a quad-core ARM Cortex A53 at 1.2 Ghz. The S9 also has twice as much memory (4 GB when J3 has 2 GB) and a larger battery (3,000 mAh when the battery of J3 is 2,600 mAh). The low end device (J3) is part of Batterylab [6, 93] : a distributed platform for battery measurements. It follows that fine grained battery measurements (via a Monsoon High Voltage Power Monitor [66] directly connected to the device's battery) are available for this device. Automation of the above operations is realized via the Android Debugging Protocol (ADB) run over wifi to avoid noise on the power measurements caused by USB powering.
Execution time per operation. In Figure 9 , we present the average duration (and standard deviation as error-bars) of each ZKSENSE's operation, per device. As one can observe, regardless of the device, bot detection is extremely fast, i.e., about 0.3 seconds. The cryptographic operations of hashing and ZKP generation are instead more challenging operations, lasting on a S9 device about 24 and 174.5 seconds, respec- tively. While measuring the same operations on a cheap, low end device like J3 we see that although detection takes the same amount of time, hashing and ZKP generation take respectively 7.8× and 3.57× more than previously in S9.
CPU utilization per operation. In Figure 10 , we show the CPU utilization per operation and device. Since no significant difference was observed between the baseline and detection operation, we improve the figure visibility by reporting only one boxplot representative of both operation. The figure shows, overall, minimal CPU utilization associated with bot detection 9 and hashing operations. Even on the less powerful J3, hashing only causes CPU peaks of about 30-40%. The ZKP generation is by far the most expensive operation. While easy to manage for the S9 device (e.g., CPU utilization higher than 20% for only 25% of the operation duration, it can be challenging for an entry level device like the J3 for which the plot shows high CPU utilization (90% of higher).
Memory usage per operation. In Figure 11 , we summarize ZKSENSE's memory usage as reported by procstats tool over each hour of testing and more specifically we present both USS (Unique Set Size -or in other words the total private memory of an Android process), and PSS (Proportional Set Size -where shared memory pages are divided by the number of processes sharing them). Again, hashing and ZKP are the most memory intensive operations with peaks of respectively 200MB and 1 GB. PSS and USS are fairly close because of the (mostly) unique libraries adopted by ZKSENSE.
Battery consumption. Finally, we quantify the extra battery discharge (in mAh) associated with ZKSENSE's key operations. First, we compute the battery discharge of each operation from the fine grain current and voltage measurements reported by the power meter. Next, we derive the additional battery discharge cause by each ZKSENSE's operation by subtracting the baseline discharge from each specific operation. In Figure 12 , we plot the results. As expected from the previous results, the battery overhead due to ZKSENSE's detection mechanism is negligible. Conversely, hashing and ZKP computation consume an extra 10 and 50mAh, respectively. On the J3's battery (2,600 mAh), this implies that each ZKSENSE's validation cost about 2% of the device battery. Note that this is a worst case operation, given the entry level device. The lower duration and CPU utilization, coupled with bigger batteries, make ZKSENSE less noticeable in term of battery consumption on more powerful devices. It is important to note, at this point, that ZKSENSE is designed to perform bot detection asynchronously and not to detract from the user experience. Nevertheless, it is wise to schedule ZKSENSE's operations depending on the device state, e.g., skip when in power saving mode and prioritize while the device is in charge. In addition, as discussed in Section 2, utilizing ZK-STARKs instead of ZK-SNARKs for the construction of the proofs can reduce the computation overhead of the prover. Hence, we believe that a possible mature ZK-STARKs library can improve the performance of ZKSENSE. In Section 7, we describe further potential performance optimizations of ZKSENSE and the scenario of implementing real-time attestation of each and every user action.
Discussion
In this section, we discuss potential extensions of ZKSENSE, what other data sources can be leveraged and how one can optimize performance and provide a real-time humanness attestation of each and every user action.
ZKSENSE Extensions
As described in 4.1, in this paper, we build upon the observation that a human's actions while visiting a web page or an app trigger device motion. As a result, in ZKSENSE we leverage two motion sensors of a mobile device: gyroscope and accelerometer to assess the humanness of a performed action. However, there are many more signals that can be integrated in ZKSENSE in an attempt to not only increase the accuracy (accelerometer and gyroscope alone achieve 91% even in case of artificial device movement e.g., device docked on a swing) but also enable reliable bot detection even in case of more sophisticated bot attacks: via robotic arms [52] , or click farms with actual human workers [20, 61] .
Ambient Light and Battery Sensor
Sensors capable of providing important features to the provable classifier of ZKSENSE may include Ambient Light Sensor (ALS) and battery status sensor [67] . Indeed, there are already commercial products [1] exploiting data from these sensors. In particular, the ambient light sensor, by detecting the presence of ambient light through time can reveal information regarding the position of the device: e.g., device being always indoor, always under artificial light, which can give strong indication regarding the general use of the mobile device. What is more, data from battery status can reveal information regarding the intensity of the mobile use: e.g., a fast drained battery during specific time windows indicates intense use by human, when user activity on an always charging mobile device is a strong indication of automation.
It is apparent, that the exploitation of the above information triggers severe privacy implications since it is capable to reveal sensitive information about the device owner e.g., usage patterns, their daily working/idle schedule etc.Therefore, the exploitation of such sources must be carefully designed to always preserve the privacy of the user in order to be aligned with the goals of ZKSENSE as described in Section 3.1.
GPS Sensor, Click Farms and Proof of Movement
While ZKSENSE can detect automation and ensure that the device is being used by a human, it is still vulnerable against malicious but true human clicks. Such malicious human clicks one can find in the case of click farms where human workers sitting in front of hundreds of decked devices and interact with every one of them performing very specific and carefully planed actions in order to pass the automation checks (e.g., CAPTCHAs). In this case, ZKSENSE fails because there is not only a bot interacting with the device but an actual human who passes the automation checks and then the bot can take over to complete the fraud process.
A possible extension which could enable ZKSENSE to mitigate such strong attack scenarios is the exploitation of the mobile's GPS sensor in order to prove to an auditor that the device and the user are not static in a warehouse but there is a portion of the conducted user activity that has been performed in different geolocations. Of course, revealing such information to other parties is very sensitive so the extension must rely on a proof of movement without neither the moving patterns nor the raw GPS coordinates to be revealed.
To address this, one could use geohash [68] , a geocode system which encodes a geographic location into a short string of letters and digits, together with ZK-SNARKs. Geohash provides hashes of nearby places that present similar prefixes, i.e., if two locations are nearby, it is likely that the first letters and digits of the encoding will coincide. This results in two neighbouring GPS coordinates having a smaller hamming distance than two distant coordinates. By using geohash and ZK-SNARKs one can generate a zero knowledge proof of 2 points with hamming distance greater than m (where m is the hamming distance equivalent of 4 kilometers for example). This way, the device can prove to an auditor that: The user has been in two points separated by more than 4 kilometers.
Performance Optimization and Real-time Attestation
In Section 6, we assumed a scenario where the user's actions gets attested asynchronously, the user gets a number of blind tokens upon successful humanness verification which he can consume later in order to get access to online services. However, one would envision a real-time humanness attestation mechanism, where bot detection will take place synchronously on each and every user action.
In order for such an approach to be practical, architectural support is needed to significantly decrease the execution time of a ZK proof generation on mobile devices. Similar to the hardware support provided by vendors in case of the Ten-sorFlow library which can now run in the mobile device's GPU [87] or Intel's Advanced Encryption Standard instruction set (AES-NI) hardware accelerator [54] , the generation of ZK proofs needs to be outsourced to a dedicated co-processor in order for systems like ZKSENSE to provide real-time humanness attestation to the user's interactions.
Related Work
In this section, we present the existing works on: (i) mechanisms related to bot detection, (ii) the privacy concerns while using motion sensor data, (iii) the techniques that provide privacy preserving and provable ML, and we put our work into the context.
Bot Detection
To prevent automated programs, or bots, from abusing online services, the widely adopted solution is to deploy a CAPTCHA system. The early form of CAPTCHA typically requires users to identify text from a distorted image.
However, text-based CAPTCHA schemes have been proven to be insecure as machines achieved 99.8% success rate in identifying distorted text [21, 37, 97] . Audio-based CAPTCHAs have also been used to assist visually impaired people, but they are difficult to solve, with over half of users failed during their first attempt [86] . Therefore, CAPTCHA service providers, such as Google, started to test image-based CAPTCHA schemes, which require users to select images that match given description [38] . Nevertheless, Sivakorn et al. demonstrated that more than 70% of image-based Google reCAPTCHA and Facebook image CAPTCHA can be efficiently solved using deep learning [83, 101] .
Walgampaya et al. designed a multi-level data fusion algorithm, which combines scores from individual clicks to generate more robust evidence, to detect click fraud [95] . Nevertheless, these CAPTCHA systems require users to perform additional tasks and deliver worse user experience, especially when running on mobile devices [78] . To counter this, Google reCAPTCHA v2 use a risk analysis engine to avoid interrupting users unnecessarily [39] . This engine collects and analyses relevant data during click events to attest the humanness of the user. The latest reCAPTCHA v3 no longer requires users to click a button but instead it studies user interactions within a webpage and gives a score that represents the likelihood that a user is a human [40] . Although these CAPTCHA schemes are invisible to users, a plethora of sensitive data, including cookies, browser plugins, and all JavaScript objects, is collected [57] that could be used to fingerprint the user's browser and link user's online activities [49, 94] .
With smartphones and IoT devices gaining popularity, more bot detection schemes now focus on mobile devices, where more types of embedded sensors are available. Most of these schemes require users to perform additional motion tasks. For instance, Shrestha et al. showed that waving gestures could be used to attest the intention of users [82] . Guerar et al. designed a bot detection system that asks users to tilt their device according to the description to prove they are human [46] . Hupperich et al. presented a movement-based CAPTCHA scheme that requires users to perform certain gestures (e.g., hammering and fishing) using their device [53] . There are also some studies focusing on designing an invisible CAPTCHA scheme for the mobile. In particular, De Luca et al. exploited touch screen data during screen unlocking to authenticate users [28] . Guerar et al. suggested a brightness-based bot prevention mechanism, BrightPass [47] . BrightPass random generates a sequence of circles with different brightness when typing a PIN; users will input misleading lie digits in circles with low brightness. Buriro et al. proposed a behaviouralbased authentication scheme for banking apps, which uses timing and device motion information during password typing to identify genuine users [16] .
The work that is most closely related to ours is the Invisible CAPPCHA [45] . Similar to ZKSENSE, Invisible CAPPCHA leveraged the different device acceleration appearing on a finger touch and a software touch to make a decision about whether a user is a bot. However, Invisible CAPPCHA only considers simple tap and vibration events; its accuracy on more complicated touch events (e.g., drag, long press, and double tap) is unclear. In comparison, ZKSENSE considers more types of touch events and works regardless of the device movement. To improve the accuracy, ZKSENSE uses more data sources in addition to accelerometer and introduces context into the detection.
Privacy Concerns of Motion Sensor Data
Previous studies have shown that motion sensor data could expose sensitive information about a user. In particular, TouchLogger [19] , TapLogger [96] , TapPrints [65] , and AC-Cessory [71] can infer user inputs on a touch screen an steal user passwords based on the device acceleration data during touch events. Mehrnezhad et al. demonstrated that similar attacks can also be launched via Javascript [63] . In addition, extensive studies have proven that user activity can be accurately tracked from the motion data [77, 80] . Other researchers have also shown that personal user information, such as gender, age, weight, and height can be leaked from the sensory data [25, 62] . Most recently, Zhang et al. [100] revealed that a globally unique device fingerprint can be generated from the motion sensor data. These studies strongly motivate us to design a privacy-preserving CAPTCHA scheme that does not reveal any sensitive sensor data to the server.
Privacy Preserving and Provable ML
A potential approach to offer privacy preserving machine learning is to evaluate the model locally, avoiding data to be sent to the server. However, if, unlike ZKSENSE, such approach is taken without proving correct evaluation of the model [9, 48, 90] , verification is lost. In these papers the model is evaluated for targeted advertising, which can be argued that users are interested in evaluating the latter correctly, removing like that the need of verifying the correct evaluation. However, in other cases (such as bot detection) the user's interest might be of faking the evaluation model, and therefore such limits open the gap for user attacks.
To the best of our knowledge, there are only 2 papers aiming to provide provable machine learning local evaluation without a trusted execution environment. The first one by Davidson et al. [27] tries to solve a similar problem, where personalization of a user device is done by evaluating a model locally on the user's machine. This work uses Bayesian classification, for which they need from 100-300 feature words. The generation of correct model evaluation for such range of feature words ranges from 30 to 80 seconds. Moreover, this study uses standard techniques for constructing zero knowledge proofs, which give a big overhead to the verifier. For our particular use case (where the verifier may need to handle several requests simultaneously), such an overhead for the verifier is not acceptable. The second one by Danezis et al. [24] proposes a solution where after the evaluation of Random Forest and Hidden Markov models, the user generates a zero knowledge proof of correct evaluation. However, this paper misses an evaluation study or availability of the code, which makes a study of the scalability of their approach inaccessible. Moreover, as in [27] , the zero knowledge proofs give a big overhead to the verifier.
Conclusion
Service providers need a reliable way to attest whether a client is human or not and thus prevent user-side automation and bots from abusing their services. Current solutions require (i) either additional user actions (e.g., solve mathematical quizzes or pattern recognition) like CAPTCHAs or (ii) user behavioral data to be sent to the server, thus raising significant privacy concerns.
In this paper, we propose ZKSENSE: a novel type of bot detection scheme, which is both (i) frictionless for the user and (ii) privacy-preserving. ZKSENSE leverages motion sensor outputs during common user interactions (e.g., click events) to identify bots and leverages zero knowledge (ZK) proofs to guarantee the integrity of the result. We tested our system under different bot scenarios: (i) when device is resting (on a table), (ii) when there is artificial movement from device's vibration, (iii) when the device is docked on a artificial movement generating swinging cradle, and it was able to detect if an action was triggered by a bot or a human with 91% accuracy. We believe that ZKSENSE presents a viable alternative to CAPTCHAs on mobile devices.
